enough to send me to the French. A search for foundations seemed utterly antithetical to the general movement of Foucault's work. I found it hard to believe he had ever asserted that his own work was a search for a new foundation for anything at all.
As I discovered, the French is fairly opaque. Foucault made the statement more or less off the cuff, and the result is less than perfectly articulate. 3 But I was relieved to note the absence of the French nouns for "search" and "foundation," as well as the verb for "to analyze." A less misleading and more helpful translation might be something like this:
How to read the relation between ways of distinguishing true and false and ways of governing oneself and others? The will to found each of them
["them" being these practices: (1) distinguishing true and false and (2) governing oneself and other] entirely anew, each by the other (to discover an altogether different division [of true and false] by another manner of governing oneself and governing oneself otherwise by taking another division as point of departure), this is "political spirituality" (DC IV, 30, translation mine).
Foucault is not talking about a search for a new foundation but about a transformative activity that creates its own departure points as a means of moving beyond itself. So whatever "political spirituality" is, it is not a search for foundations. To get a sense of what it is, we must read the whole passage in the context of the last several years of Foucault's work, primarily his work in ethics, 4 which is the subject of the rest of this essay.
By 1978, when Foucault made this statement, he had already explicitly reworked the notion of truth. In an interview in 1976, he said, "'Truth' is to be understood as a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation, and operation of statements. 'Truth' is linked in a circular relation with systems of power that produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and which extend it-a 'regime' of truth." 5 The term governmentality designates a technological domain formed by the overlap of two regions of concern-with the self and with others. It has to do with methods and techniques used to cultivate the self in the process of becoming a good manager of others.
Thus it always has both an ethical and a political dimension. Governmentality is the work of creating or maintaining oneself in a set of skills and style of existence, an ethos, that enables one to affect others' actions, that enables one to exercise power in certain ways. At one level is the interplay of individuals seeking to influence their immediate situation-the give and take among colleagues on a committee, e.g., or the wrangling between dealer and customer over the price of a car. Outcomes may be predictable in such encounters, but they do vary. In the moment it is not clear which party will prevail.
Such struggles are commonplace, the stuff of everyday existence. At the other extreme lies the almost total predictability granted by a situation so rigidified that there is hardly any loose interplay of forces at all. When the guards come for the condemned prisoner, he will go with them and the execution will occur; there is nothing he else can do. But such domination is rare; most situations include some range of possibility. Between the loose and unpredictable interplay and the lack of interplay and its virtual determinism, there is a level of power relation that Foucault calls "general strategy" or "regime. child believes a parent who claims that a spanking hurts him more than it hurts the child, but there is truth in the claim; whatever disciplinary method parents use, they have to discipline themselves to it to follow it consistently and completely. Such is the case with any disciplinary technology applied extensively within any set of human relationships.
In sum, governmentality is the point of intersection between two areas of concern: (1) "technologies of power, which determine the conduct of individuals and submit them to certain ends or domination" and (2) "technologies of the self, which permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality." 9 Whenever we strive to develop skills or attitudes in ourselves in order to manage, educate, or otherwise influence other people's behavior, we are working within the realm of governmentality. Foucault wanted his work to have material, political effects. Thus it is fair to say that Foucault's philosophical practice was political.
It is also fair to say that his practice was spiritual, if we allow his rather tentative definition of "spirituality" in an interview from 1984: "By spirituality I mean … the subject's attainment of a certain mode of being and the transformations that the subject must carry out on itself to attain this mode of being" (ECSPF, 294). Askesis is always spiritual, then, for it is always work of the subject engaged in self-transformation. It is also "the living substance of philosophy," "an exercise of oneself in the activity of thought."
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Thus a case can be made that all of Foucault's philosophical work is what he calls "political spirituality"-political in that it is an exercise in governmentality, spiritual in that it is an exercise in self-transformation. However, I want to push this issue of the meaning of "political spirituality" further. I believe that Foucault meant something more specific by "political spirituality" than simply philosophical work that aims at social and self-transformation; moreover, I contend that Foucault's writings are not exhausted by their governmental or their self-transformative functions, are not simply artifacts of selfovercoming and political practice.
Knowledge is for cutting, 12 Foucault said; the place where Foucault's genealogically generated knowledge cuts into selves to incite overcoming is precisely at the point where true is divided from false. Foucault's genealogical works operate at the site where our regimes of truth are grounded, the site of the knowing subject and its epistemic, as well as its ethical, judgment. Thus we must look at Foucault's genealogical critique, his "political spirituality," not merely as a political practice and/or a practice of caring for the self. In
Foucault's work, practices of governmentality are bound up with critique of ways of dividing true and false, which is why he goes on to say, "My general theme isn't society but the discourse of true and false, by which I mean the correlative formation of domains and objects and of the verifiable, falsifiable discourses that bear on them; and it's not just their formation that interests me, but the effects in the real to which they are linked." It is appropriate to pull up short at the articulation of this question. There are two obvious problems with such a project. First is that in undertaking it one would be making an intellectual effort to place transform the very basis of intellection. And second is that one would be aiming to effect a transformation that is not in the service of any known value or ideal. Given these problems, it is hard to know how to proceed. But of course that is the point-knowing how to proceed means, precisely, not placing in question I close with a quotation from Foucault that I find very significant in relation to these issues: "Can it be said that the subject is the only possible form of existence? Can't there
